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D EFENSIVE S ELF by Michael Rosenzweig
Adapted with permission from the forthcoming article,
"Defensive Stock Repurchases," Harvard Law Review,
Volume 99, by Michael Bradley, Associate Professor of
Finance, University of Michigan, Graduate School of Business Administration, and Michael Rosenzweig, Associate
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (which
article is hereinafter referred to as Bradley & Rosenzweig).
For the most part, documentation is not provided in this
adaptation, as full citations may be found in the aforementioned article.
Target companies employ a variety of defensive tactics in an effort to thwart hostile bidders. In recent
years, targets have resorted with increasing frequency
to repurchases of their own stock to defeat hostile
tender offers. This tactic may serve several strategic
purposes. First, such repurchases may increase the
percentage of the target's stock that is owned by management or management loyalists who are unlikely to
tender, thereby enhancing the probability that the bid
will fail. Second, a repurchase may raise the price of
the target's stock above the tender offer price, forcing
the bidder to confront the unwelcome dilemma of having to increase its offer or abandon the fight. Third, the
repurchased stock may come from the bidder itself,
which may agree as a condition of the sale to terminate
its effort to win control of the target.
We may refer to all target stock repurchases that are
undertaken to defeat a hostile takeover bid as "defensive stock repurchases." While target managers often
effect such repurchases in the open market at prevailing market prices, many recent repurchases have been
structured as cash tender offers, in part because managers believe that such a "self-tender offer" will attract
the target's stock more quickly than an open market
purchase program.1
Because they believe that management resistance to
premium tender offers diminishes shareholder welfare, some commentators would bar target managers
from fighting takeover bids with stock repurchases.
I disagree. I believe that defensive stock repurchases
should be permitted, so long as they are regulated to
preserve a competitive balance among takeover contestants. This view derives from a theory of tender
offer regulation based on the notion that there is a
competitive market for corporate control, in which
management teams (including the target's management) contend for control over the target's assets. This
theory suggests that a fair competition among these
management teams helps provide an efficient allocation of corpora!_e _resources. Thus, I conclude that
tender offer regulation should be fashioned so as to
avoid conferring a competitive advantage on one contestant or another, which is also consistent with Congress's goals in regulating takeover activity. Under this
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T ENDER Q FFERS
view, defensive self-tender offers2 should be permitted
(subject to certain conditions) in order to afford incumbent management a more equal opportunity to compete for control of the target.
I. A Proposed Theory of Tender Offer Regulation

Rather than offer either a general analysis of hostile
takeovers or a broad critique of existing tender offer
regulations, this article focuses on a particular aspect of
those regulations, maintaining that if we choose to regulate hostile tender offers, we should endeavor
to treat target and bidding managers evenhandedly,
in order to facilitate allocation of corporate resources
to their highest-valued uses.
There is a good deal of controversy among commentators regarding the reasons for hostile takeovers and
the motivations of bidders, which naturally leads to
disagreements about how to regulate target management defensive responses. On one hand, there are
those who believe that tender offers are often used by
so-called "corporate raiders" to expropriate the wealth
of target ~hareholders. These commentators argue that
bidders frequently exploit target shareholders by
acquiring target firms for less than their pre-offer value
or purchasing target shares at prices that fail to reflect
the true value of the target's resources; they often
support the use of legal rules to protect target shareholders from such exploitation, including rules that
provide target managers with considerable latitude in
defeating unwanted takeover bids. Members of this
camp presumably would permit target managers to
use either an open market stock repurchase program
or a self-tender offer to thwart a hostile bid. Indeed,
the extreme form of this view would be to give target
management veto power over all takeover bids.
Some believe, on the other hand, that tender offers
are frequently used by bidding firms to remove inefficient or self-dealing target managers. These commentators argue that takeover premiums often reflect
mismanagement of the target firm and the bidder's
belief that it can manage the firm more efficiently; they
view target management resistance with suspicion,
and commonly argue for greater restrictions on target managers' responses to unwanted takeover bids.
Presumably, members of this camp would preclude
target managers from pursuing either an open market
repurchase program or a self-tender offer in the wake
of a hostile bid. Some have even advocated a rule requiring target managers to remain passive in the face of
an interfirm bid.
Existing empirical evidence appears to refute the
"corporate raider" theory. Thus, studies reveal that target shareholders typically realize significant capital
gains as a result of interfirm bids. More important,
these studies show that the average post-execution
market price of the target shares not purchased by the
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acquiring firm is significantly greater than the average
pre-offer price of these shares. In other words, even
non-participating target shareholders earn significant
positive returns as a result of a successful tender offer
for their firm.
At the same time, neither does the evidence confirm
the "inefficient or self-dealing management" hypothesis, for it says nothing about the source of the capital
gains that accrue to target shareholders. To be sure,
these gains may stem from the ouster of inefficient or
self-dealing target managers, but they may also result
from economies of scale, the combination of complementary resources, the redeployment of assets to more
profitable uses, the exploitation of market power, or
any number of value-creating mechanisms that fall under the general rubric of "corporate synergies." The
evidence does not and cannot discriminate among

... defensive stock repurchases should
be permitted, so long as they are regulated to preserve a competitive balance
among takeover contestants.

these alternative explanations for the gains from
tender offers. Indeed, there may be no "general theory" that explains tender offers; the sources of the synergies that are created through tender offers may well
vary from case to case.
Thus, the "synergy" theory of tender offers admits
the inefficient or self-dealing management hypothesis
as a particular explanation (among many) for tender
offer gains, but does not assume that target managers
are generally inefficient or self-dealing. Instead, under
the general synergy theory, the tender offer is viewed
as a transaction in the market for corporate control: a
contest betwe.e n the managers of the bidding and target firms for the right to control allocation of the target's resources. From this perspective, the transaction
need not involve either corporate raiders or inefficient
or self-dealing target managers.
I find the general synergy theory to be an attractive
explanation of takeover activity, for it is consistent with
existing empirical evidence and also allows one to
reject the counterintuitive notion that target managers
are commonly inefficient or dishonest. Thus, I view the
hostile tender offer as a competition among rival management teams for the right to control the target's
resources.
The social welfare implications of this view follow
from the general theory that a competitive market is
sufficient to ensure that resources will be put to their
highest-valued uses. In other words, fair competition
among rival management teams can prevent acquiring
firms from effecting value-decreasing takeovers (i.e.,
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acquisitions for less than the target's pre-offer value)
and keep target managers from defeating valueincreasing acquisitions (i.e., acquisitions at a price
exceeding the target's pre-offer value). If there is to be
regulation of tender offers, the law should treat target
and bidding managers evenhandedly; that is, tender
offer regulation should avoid conferring an advantage
on either managerial team in the contest for control of
the target's assets. From this perspective, permitting
self-tender offers, subject to certain conditions discussed below, tends to "even the playing field," or put
target management and the managers of the bidding
firm in more equivalent positions.3
This view is also consistent with Congress's goals in
regulating tender offers. In adopting the Williams Act,
Congress wished to effect a neutral balance between
target managers and outside bidders, interfering as little as possible with the market for corporate control. 4
To be sure, Congress did not articulate this view as part
of a broader desire to facilitate allocation of the target's
resources to their highest-valued uses. But the argument that target management and hostile bidders
should be governed by the same rules in competing for
control of the target because that advances an efficient
allocation of the target's resources is certainly consistent with the congressional goal of neutrality.

... if we choose to regulate hostile tender
offers, we should endeavor to treat target
and biddin~ managers even handedly, in
order to facilitate allocation of corporate
resources to their highest-valued uses.

II. An Economic Justification for
Defensive Self-Tender Offers
A. Protection Against Corporate Raiders
The defensive self-tender offer is an important safeguard against would-be corporate raiders. To see this
argument, consider an interfirm tender offer in which
the recognized objective of the bidding firm is to secure
51 % of the target shares for a price that is just above
market, liquidate the firm and expropriate the wealth
of the remaining minority interest. In the absence of an
alternative offer, the wealth-maximizing response of
each target shareholder to this bid is to tender his
shares. If the offer is unsuccessful, his wealth will remain the same whether he tenders or not. But if the
offer is successful, the effect on his wealth will depend
on his tendering decision: if he does not tender, his
entire interest in the target will be worthless; if he
tenders he will receive (assuming pro rationing) at least
51 % of the pre-offer market value of his holdings. Since
the decision of any one_target shareholder cannot affect

the outcome of the offer, the rational response of each
is to tender his shares to the bidding firm. Consequently, if target shareholders are a homogeneous
group, 5 this individual optimizing behavior will insure
the success of the outstanding offer even though the
acquisition will decrease the aggregate wealth of the
initial target shareholders.
One solution to this apparent "prisoner's dilemma"
is to allow the target managers to engage in a selftender offer. As long as the total value of the outstanding interfirm tender offer is less than the total pre-offer
value of the target shares, target managers can always
fashion a self-tender offer that dominates the takeover
bid. In the current example, target managers can
respond to the takeover bid by making a self-tender
offer for 51 % of the firm's stock at a significant premium
above market. At the maximum, the target managers
can offer up to a 96% premium for 51 % of the target
shares. 6 Note also that so long as the repurchase is
effected on a pro rata basis, the premium paid for the
repurchased shares is a matter of indifference to the
target shareholders. Regardless of the magnitude of
the premium, pro rata execution insures that the
wealth of tendering shareholders will remain at preoffer levels. 7
The preceding analysis suggests that the self-tender
offer can be used by target managers to defeat a valuedecreasing interfirm tender offer. Clearly, however,
this capital market transaction is not the only protection target shareholders have from corporate raiders.
Legal rules governing fiduciary responsibilities to
minority shareholders and the appraisal remedy also
restrict corporate raiding. In addition, competition
among corporate raiders works for the protection of
target shareholders: ignoring differential abilities in
expropriating wealth and the costs of making an offer,
competition to become the successful raider should (in
theory) bid up the value of the controlling block to the
market value of 100% of the firm's securities. In the current example, competition among would-be raiders
would force the winning bidder to pay a 96% premium
(i.e., 1/F) for a controlling interest.
Thus, there are forces operating in the market for
corporate control other than the self-tender offer that
serve to protect target shareholders from corporate
raiders. But these may not, by themselves, offer sufficient protection. First, legal rules may be inadequate
to police effectively against corporate raids. This is so
not only because of the acknowledged difficulties of invoking the appraisal remedy and getting "fair value"
given the variety of valuation techniques employed by
the courts, but also because corporate raids less extreme than the example given earlier may be difficult
to detect and police.
Second, the raid on the target firm's assets may not
take the form of an explicit, lower back-end price in a
two-tier tender offer, but result from a decision by the
acquirer not to "cash out" the minority shareholders. In
other words, there may be no explicit, lower-back-end
freeze out merger subject to the appraisal remedy, but

simply a partial tender offer, with the bidder then exploiting the subsidiary through internal transactions. It
is true that legal rules governing the fiduciary responsibilities of majority shareholders may limit the extent
to which the acquiring firm can "move" assets out of
the target. But one must also recognize the difficulties
courts have in constraining such activities, even where
they are willing to endorse such shareholder fiduciary
obligations.

Existing empirical evidence appears to
refute the 11corporate raider'' theory.
Thus, studies reveal that target shareholders typically realize significant capital gains as a result of interfirm bids.

Finally, one should not assume that competition
among potential raiders is sufficient to protect target
shareholders from a value-decreasing takeover bid. In
most competitive markets, rents are competed away
over time, so that actors have an incentive to compete
in order to capture these rents in the short term. But in
the market for corporate control, competition for targets usually consists of merely a series of revised bids.
That is, a potential competitor may capture no rents
from competing, because it may be outbid before it
actually purchases any target s~ares. Since the ultimate
outcome of such a competition may be to dissipate all
potential gains from acquiring control of the target
without allowing any competitor (even the winner) to
reap any of these gains, the ability of any one competitor to capture rents is considerably more uncertain
and the incentive of another firm to outbid a raider
may be significantly reduced. In view of these concerns, why not give target managers the responsibility
and wherewithal to defeat a raiding bid, particularly if
(as argued below) there are no social costs in doing so?
B. The Potential Social Costs of Defensive Self-Tender Offers
It is important to show that permitting defensive selftenders would not enable target managers to defeat desirable value-increasing acquisitions. I shall attempt to
do so by advancing a hypothetical numerical example.
Assume that we have an all-equity firm valued at
$8,000 with 200 shares outstanding, each trading at
$40. Assume further that a bidding firm has made a
tender offer for 100 of the firm's shares at $60 per share.
The bidding firm has stated that if the offer is successful, it will use its majority position in the target to
force a redemption of the remaining 100 shares at their
current market price of $40 per share.
Now imagine that the target managers attempt to defeat the takeover bid through a self-tender offer for 120
of the firm's shares at $60 per share. Such a premium
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repurchase has a predictable effect on the post-offer
price of the target shares. Specifically, a premium
repurchase is economically equivalent to a "front-end
loaded, two-tier offer." The front end·is the repurchase
premium and the necessarily lower back end is the
post-acquisition market price per share. 8 In the present
example-with a pre-acquisition market price of $40
per share, a repurchase price of $60 per share, and a
fraction of shares purchased of .6-a dilution of $30
per share results. (That is, the post-acquisition market
price per share will be $10.)
As suggested earlier, a front-end loaded, two-tier
tender offer, even if in the form of a self-tender offer,
has the potential for placing target shareholders in a
situation not unlike the classic prisoner's dilemma of
game theory. In an attempt to avoid the inevitable dilution that would occur if the self-tender offer succeeded,
target shareholders would be induced to reject the
interfirm offer and accept the self-tender offer, even
though the former is of greater value.
The solution to this apparent prisoner's dilemma is a
revised offer by the initial bidding firm. In order to defeat the two-tier bid made by the target managers, the
bidding firm must respond with its own two-tier bid.
The optimal bidding strategy is to maximize the difference between the front end and the back end of the
offer. Specifically, if target shareholders are faced with
two front-end loaded two-tier bids, they will tender
to the offer with the maximum difference between the
front end and the back end.9 Moreover, the management team that can put the target resources to their
highest-valued use can also formulate a bid that
maximizes the difference between the front and back
ends. 10

I find the general synergy theory to be an
attractive explanation of takeover activity,
for it is consistent with existing empirical evidence and also allows one to reject
the counterintuitive notion that target
managers are commonly inefficient or
dishonest.

In the present example, the bidding firm need only
match the repurchase offer in terms of the number of
shares and the back-end price, and compete with the
target managers on the front-end price. Since the bidding firm is willing to pay a total of $10,000 for the target firm, a back-end price of $10 for 80 shares implies
that it would pay up to $9,200 in total for the 120 shares
on the front end, or $76.67 per share. This translates
into a premium of 92%. Clearly, such an interfirm offer
would dominate the repurchase offer since the interfirm offer has a front-end premium of 92% and the re32

purchase offer has a front-end premium of only 50%,
while both are for the same number of target shares
and have the same back-end price.
Significantly, the amount that target managers can
offer for target shares is limited by the target's pre-offer
market value. In an efficient capital market, the preoffer value of the target equity is an unbiased estimate
of the value of these claims under current management
(under the firm's current investment/production decisions). This value therefore places an upper bound
on the amount creditors will offer to finance the repurchase. In the current example, target managers can
only offer up to $8,000 (or $66.67 per share) for 60% of
the firm's shares because presumably capital market
agents would not pay more to finance the repurchase.
If the target managers were to repurchase the 60% at
$66.67 per share, the entire equity of the firm would be
"cashed out."

If there is to be regulation of tender offers, the law should treat target and bidding managers evenhandedfy; that is,
tender offer regulation should avoid conferring an advantage on either managerial
team in the contest for control of the target's assets.

The preceding analysis is general in its application.
The management team that can put the target resources to their highest-valued use can always fashion
a dominating two-tier bid. Thus, so long as the managers of the target and bidding firms are able to compete on an equal footing, 11 the team that can maximize
the value of the target can also formulate a controlwinning bid.
There are, however, two important qualifications to
the foregoing discussion. First, if target managers can
effect a self-tender offer for less than the interest being
sought by the outside bidder, they will enjoy a clear
advantage in the competition for target shares, enabling them to defeat even value-increasing bids. Second, target managers will enjoy a similar advantage if
they can exclude the bidder from participating in a selftender. I conclude by discussing each of these
qualifications.
1. Self-tenders for fewer shares than the bidder seeks. Following the optimal bidding strategy described above
(and recalling that the maximum price target managers
can offer in a self-tender for F of its outstanding shares
is P/F, where P0 is the pre-offer market price of target
shares), the target managers in the current example
could (in the extreme case) reduce the number of
shares sought in the self-tender from 120 to 1 and
increase the offer price from $60 per share to p o/F, or

$8,000. Since the difference between the front-end and
back-end prices would therefore be $8,000 for the defensive self-tender and $20 for the interfirm bid, target
shareholders would tender to the target rather than the
outside bidder.
While a defensive self-tender for one share is highly
unlikely, this example illustrates the basic point that
target managers will be able to defeat value-increasing
bids if they are permitted to tender for fewer shares
than the outside bidder wishes to purchase.
In the instant case, although the bidding firm is willing to pay up to $10,000 to gain control of the target, it

... defensive self-tenders [should] be
permitted only if they seek the number of
shares sought by the bidding firm.

obviously would not be willing to pay that amount for
just one share or, more generally, for less than a controlling interest. In other words, a bidder willing to offer
more than the current value of the target firm for a certain number of shares (usually a control block) will be
unwilling to spend that amount for a smaller block. But
if target managers can make a self-tender that offers up
to the entire value of the firm for such a smaller block,
they will defeat the outside bid. To overcome such a
self-tender, the bidder must be prepared to purchase
fewer shares than it originally wanted, in the usual
case, a non-controlling interest, for a price that exceeds
the target's total pre-offer value. By effecting a selftender for fewer shares than the bidder seeks, therefore, target managers can defeat even a value-increasing bid. 12
In light of this possibility, I must qualify my proposal
to allow defensive self-tenders by recommending that
they be permitted only if they seek at least the number
of shares sought by the bidding firm. 13 This would
keep target and bidding managers on an equal footing,
thereby facilitating the movement of corporate assets to
their highest-valued uses.
2. Discriminatory self-tenders. The validity of my
claim-that defensive self-tender offers can never be
used to defeat value-increasing bids-also depends
on a second important condition: the target must be
barred from excluding certain target shareholders from
participation in the offer. Consider, for instance, the
following illustration (using numbers drawn from my
previous example): A bidding firm purchases 25 of our
target's outstanding 200 shares in the open market before announcing a tender offer to acquire an additional
75 shares at $50 per share (again with the stipulation
that the bidder will "pick up" the remaining 100 shares
at the pre-offer price of $40 per share if the offer is successful). Assume that the target's managers again attempt to defeat the bid by repurchasing the firm's

shares, which, under my proposal, must be accomplished through a self-tender offer for at least the
number of shares sought by the bidder. Let us imagine,
however, that legal rules permit target managers to exclude the bidder from participation in the offer and that
the self-tender therefore specifies that the bidder's 25
shares are not eligible for tendering. 14 Can target management use such a self-tender offer to defeat a valueincreasing bid? Our example reveals plainly that it can.
Recall again that target managers can offer up to the
pre-offer value of the target firm ($8,000 in our example) for the shares that it wishes to repurchase. Thus, if
we assume that the target managers wish to repurchase, say, 75 shares, then the self-tender offer could
be at a price as high as $106.66 per share. As demonstrated earlier, if the target managers were to repurchase the 75 shares at a price of $106.66, the effect
would be to "cash out" the entire equity of the firm,
with the result that the remaining 125 shares would be
worthless. Shareholders other than the bidder, of
course, would be permitted to participate in the offer
on a pro rata basis, with each therefore receiving a
"blended" price or total value of about $46 per share
held (i.e., a "blended premium" of approximately $6
per share); that is, if all 175 non-bidder-owned shares
were tendered, 75 would be purchased at a price of
$106.66 per share and 100, now worthless, would be
returned to the target shareholders. But our bidder,
barred from participating in the self-tender offer,
would be left with 25 worthless shares; in effect, the
bidder would have financed the $6 per share blended
premium that is enjoyed by all other target shareholders with a capital loss equal to the total pre-offer
value of its 25 shares. To put this somewhat differently,
target managers would have expropriated $1,000 (25
shares x $40 per share) of the bidder's wealth in order
to pay a premium of $6 per share on the 175 shares held
by the other target shareholders.
The earlier analysis of optimal bidding strategy in a
control contest demonstrates that, absent a revised
offer by the bidder, the self-tender (with a difference between front and back ends of $106.66) would defeat the
outside bid (with a difference between front and back
ends of $10). It is still true, however, that the bidder will
be able to defeat the self-tender by making a revised
bid. Moreover, if the bidder does defeat the self-tender,
then by hypothesis the bidder will not suffer the capital
loss described above; obviously, the capital loss occurs
only if the target in fact purchases shares other than
the bidder's at a premium above the pre-offer market
price. But allowing the target's managers to exclude
the bidder from participating in the self-tender significantly alters the calculus for the revised bidding
strategy, and might convince the bidder to abandon its
value-increasing offer.
In order to fashion a winning revised bid, the bidder
must offer at least $8,001 to the 175 shareholders. If the
bidder follows the suggested optimal bidding strategy
and competes with target management on the frontend price for 75 shares while matching the implicit
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back-end price of zero for the remaining US shares,
therefore, it will have to offer just over $106.66 per
share for 75 shares, with the remaining shares effectively rendered worthless. Since the bidder in this case
has already invested $1,000 in the target through the
open market purchase of 25 shares, it follows that in
order to win, it must spend a minimum total of $9 ,001.
This point may be stated more generally: if a bidder
is precluded from tendering to a self-tender offer target
shares that it may own, it must compete with an offer
that, in effect, is partially financed with its own money.
A winning bidder, therefore, must be willing to spend
an aggregate amount that exceeds the pre-offer value of
the target by at least the bidder's pre-offer investment
in target shares. It follows that target managers can
defeat all value-increasing offers by bidders who are
not prepared to spend, in total acquisition costs, an
amount that exceeds the pre-offer value of the target by
at least the cost of any previous acquisitions of target
stock by the bidder. More generally, a discriminatory
self-tender can defeat all value-increasing bids that
represent synergistic gains of less than the pre-offer
value of the bidder's investment in the target's stock.

... a discriminatory self-tender can defeat
all value-increasing bids that represent
synergistic gains of less than the pre-offer
value of the bidder's investment in the
target's stock.

In the present example, a bid with total value of between $8,000 and $9,000 would be value-increasing;
given, however, the bidder's pre-offer acquisition of 25
shares and legal rules that permit target management
to exclude the bidder from participation in a self-tender
offer, the bidder would face defeat unless it were willing to spend more than $9,000. Thus, the bidder's
value-increasing bid of $50 for 75 shares, to be followed
by a second-step merger at $40 per share, would be
defeated.15
I therefore conclude that defensive self-tender offers
should be permitted (a) only on a non-discriminatory
basis, and (b) only if they seek at least the number of
shares that the interfirm bidder wishes to purchase .16
Self-tenders that either exclude or seek fewer shares
than the bidder can be used to defeat value-increasing
bids and, for that reason, should be barred. 17

CONCLUSION
Defensive self-tender offers should be permitted in
order to enable target managers to compete with hostile bidders for conhol of the target's resources. Selftender offers help prevent "corporate raiding" and-so
34

long as they are non-discriminatory and for at least the
amount of stock being sought by the outside biddercannot be used by target managers to defeat valueincreasing interfirm bids. 181

FOOTNOTES
On the other hand, existing regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (sometimes hereinafter referred to as the SEC or
the Commission) subject self-tender offers to special substantive
rules and disclosure obligations that do not apply to other defensive
stock repurchases. This dichotomous regulatory scheme creates significant incentives for target management to acquire stock in transactions (such as open market purchases) that may not be characterized
as utender offers.u For a detailed discussion of these regulations and
the phenomenon of defensive open market repurchases, see Bradley
& Rosenzweig.
The SEC promulgated the federal tender offer rules pursuant to its
authority under the Williams Act, which Congress adopted in 1968 to
regulate tender offers and issuer stock repurchases.
2 I use the term "defensive self-tender offer" to refer to a selftender that is made by the target firm in response to an unwanted
takeover bid, in an effort to thwart that bid.
3 The rules governing self-tenders closely resemble those governing tender offers by outside bidders (so-called "interfirm bids"). For a
detailed discussion of these regulations and proposed modifications
that would ueven the playing field" still further, see Bradley &
Rosenzweig.
Note also that under existing regulations, non-tender-offer defensive stock repurchases give target managers an advantage over bidding firms in competing for control of the target's resources. Michael
Bradley and I analyze this competitive advantage and suggest that it
be eliminated. Id.
4 For an extensive analysis of the legislative history of the Williams
Act, see Bradley & Rosenzweig.
My claim, it should be emphasized, is that if there is to be regulation of takeover activity, it ought to be symmetric among all contestants, including .t he current target managers, lest those least
hindered by regulation succeed in acquiring (or, in the case of incumbent management, preserving) control of the target with a lowervalued bid. I do not consider whether defensive stock repurchases
ought to be regulated, nor do I discuss whether nonregulation of takeover activity would result in the optimal competitive balance. Rather,
my analysis takes regulation of the tender offer process as given and
proposes modifications of the present regulatory scheme that would
eliminate certain competitive advantages that target managers currently enjoy.
Empirical evidence suggests that adoption of the Williams Act generally favored target managers by raising the costs of making bids
and lowering the costs of defending against them. Apparently, the
legislation itself was therefore decidedly unneutral, whatever Congress's stated intentions may have been. I do not claim that my proposed modifications would produce perfect regulatory neutrality.
But adoption of my proposals would move the Williams Act scheme
closer to the position of neutrality that Congress apparently favored.
s For an extensive discussion of the assumption of shareholder
homogeneity, and the argument that recognizing the reality of shareholder heterogeneity would not materially affect our prediction of
shareholder responses, see Bradley & Rosenzweig.
6 Algebraically, the target managers can offer a repurchase premium [(Pt/Po)-1) of up to 1/F, where Fis the fraction of target shares
sought by the bidding firm and repurchased by the target firm, Pt is
the self-tender offer price, and Po is the pre-offer price of target
shares. For a discussion of why target managers are limited to offering an amount equal to the pre-offer value of the firm, see below
pp.32.
7 The wealth of non-tendering shareholders, of course, would be
decreased. Nevertheless, this seems untroubling so long as the rules
1

governing self-tender offers ensure target shareholders a fair and
realistic opportunity to tender. Arguably, SEC Rule 13e-4, which governs self-tender offers for publicly-held securities, guarantees such
an opportunity. Thus, Rule 13e-4 provides for widely-disseminated
notice of the self-tender, a minimum period during which the offer
must remain open, and pro-rationing in the event of oversubscription.
8

For a fuller discussion of this effect, see Bradley & Rosenzweig.

It is important to understand that this is an optimal (winning)
strategy provided that target shareholders are atomistic (i.e., no one
shareholder can affect the outcome of an offer) and agnostic (i.e., no
shareholder has any knowledge of what other shareholders will do).
Given these assumptions, each shareholder will attempt to maximize
his individual welfare, even though in the process collective welfare
may be sacrificed. Obviously, if target shareholders could act collectively, maximizing the difference between the front end and the back
end would not insure victory for a particular bidder, since the target
shareholders would collectively analyze the entire value of each bid.
That is, they would evaluate each bid in terms of the fraction of
shares purchased at the offer price and the fraction purchased (or
redeemed) at the back-end price. They would then tender collectively to the bidder that offered the highest-valued total bid, and they
would be indifferent to the difference between the front end and the
back end.
When target shareholders are forced to act individually, however,
with no information other than market and offer prices, the tendering decision will tum on the difference between the front and back
ends: the higher the front end is, the greater will be the premium
realized if the offer is successful, which is an incentive to tender; the
lower the back end is, the greater will be the (expected) cost of not
tendering (i.e., the cost of not participating) if the offer is successful.
Both of these factors work to the advantage of the bidder that
maximizes the difference between the front and back ends.
Of course, if (contrary to the assumption of homogenous shareholder expectations) shareholders base their decisions on predictions
regarding the likely decisions of other shareholders or assign varying
probabilities to different possible outcomes of competing bids, they
may not tender to the management team that maximizes the difference between the front and back ends.
Ultimately, the extent to which target shareholders engage in °coordination games" or assign varying probabilities to different possible outcomes is an empirical question, as yet unanswered. There is,
however, empirical evidence that is consistent with the assumption
that target shareholders are atomistic and agnostic. Thus, Michael
Bradley has successfully used a tender offer model based on this
assumption to predict the market price of target shares during the
pendency of an interfirm bid. The Bradley study also demonstrates
that in unsuccessful offers, the post-offer price of target shares exceeds
the rejected offer premiums. Both of these findings are consistent
with the assumption that the tendering decision turns on a simple
comparison of alternative premiums.
In addition, a recent study by the SEC's Office of the Chief Economist examined 69 successful partial and two-tier offers for New York
and American Stock Exchange firms during the period 1981 through
1984, and showed that all were front-end loaded. These findings also
suggest that target shareholders respond in the predicted fashion.
9

10 Note that the availability of the appraisal remedy to target shareholders may effectively prevent an interfirm bidder from undertaking a second-step takeout merger at less than the pre-offer market
price of target shares. In addition, fair-price provisions in the target's charter may have much the same effect. Neither constraint, of
course, applies to self-tenders, where the back end is simply the
post-execution market price of target shares. Accordingly, the appraisal remedy and (where applicable) fair-price charter provisions
may place a floor under the back end for the interfirm bidder but not
the target managers. 1f so, then self-tenders could readily be used to
defeat value-increasing interfirm bids, since the target managers
would enjoy a significant competitive advantage in fashioning their
bid.
I would make two points with respect to this observation. First,
the appraisal remedy and fair-price charter provisions in fact con-

strain bidders only to the extent that a take-out merger is likely.
Some claim that a take-out is highly probable following a successful
partial bid, but base that claim on the unproven assertion that bidder
attempts to expropriate target wealth through self dealing cannot go
undetected. If this assertion is incorrect, then appraisal and fairprice provisions may be much less significant limitations on the
bidder's ability to lower the back end.
Second, it is not clear (at least to me) that appraisal and fair-price
provisions should operate against the bidder where the target's managers have responded to an interfirm bid with a defensive self-tender
offer. In other words, if (as I argue) we can rely on the defensive selftender offer to protect target shc..reholders against expropriation of
their wealth, then appraisal and fair-price provisions seem unnecessary and, given their role in possibly conferring a competitive advantage on target management, potentially quite costly. While this issue
plainly requires careful thought and more extended treatment than
I provide here, it may therefore make sense to nullify the appraisal
remedy and the target's fair-price charter provisions once the target
managers effect a defensive self-tender offer in response to an interfirm bid.
11 I have argued, in favor of allowing defensive self-tender offers,
that the tender offer process should be viewed as a competition
among management teams and that the current management team
should not be prevented from participating. One impact of my proposal, as compared with one that would bar all target management
activity, would be to increase the likelihood of competitive bidding
for the target. Commentators disagree sharply on whether competitive bidding is desirable. Some argue that competitive bidding
dissipates the gains to the ultimately successful bidder, thereby reducing the incentive to make an initial bid. Others maintain that
competitive bidding facilitates the movement of corporate resources
to their
highest-valued uses and believe that rules encouraging competitive
bidding will not necessarily reduce the level of search for takeover
targets. While I offer no new insights regarding this debate, I believe
that permitting defensive self-tenders at worst reduces the incentive
to search for value-decreasing acquisitions. If so, then that may be an
acceptable cost of my proposal.
12 After the target has repurchased the shares it seeks, however,
the bidder can make a new offer that reflects the fewer shares outstanding and the reduced value of the target, thus continuing its
quest for control. At the extreme, the bidder can wait until the target
has bought all of its shares but one and then make a dominating offer
for the remaining (controlling) share. Thus, defensive self-tenders
for fewer shares than the bidder seeks cannot by themselves defeat
value-increasing acquisition attempts. (This assumes, as I propose
below, that the target may not exclude the bidder from any defensive
self-tender offer.) They can, however, delay execution of a valueincreasing takeover, increasing its expense and providing target
management time to erect other barriers to a change of control. The
competitive advantage thus afforded target managers is sufficient
reason to bar such defensive self-tender offers.
13 Under this proposal, four recent defensive self-tender offers
would be illegal. In July, 1985, CBS responded to a hostile takeover
bid by Ted Turner for 67 per cent of CBS's shares with a defensive
self-tender seeking 21 per cent of its stock. In August, 1985, Revlon
made a self-tender offer for 5 million of its 38.3 million common
shares in an effort to fend off a bid by Pantry Pride for any or all
Revlon shares. In October, 1985, Cluett Peabody responded to a
tender offer by a group led by Paul Bilzerian for all of Cluett's outstanding shares with a defensive self-tender seeking slightly less
than 25 per cent of its stock. And in December, 1985, Union Carbide
responded to an all-cash, any-or-all bid by GAF with a defensive selftender for 35 per cent (later increased to 55 per cent) of its common
stock.
The defensive-self tender recently effected by Unocal Corporation
to defeat a takeover attempt by T. Boone Pickens, Jr., discussed
below, would also be barred by the rule I propose.
14 This example essentially describes the recent takeover bid by
T. Boone Pickens, Jr. for control of Unocal Corporation, and Unocal's
self-tender offer made in response thereto.
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15 In the Unocal-Pickens contest, Pickens agreed to abandon his
value-increasing bid almost immediately after the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld the condition of the Unocal self-tender offer barring
Pickens from tendering any of his Unocal stock.
16 The SEC recently proposed amendments to Rule 13e-4 that,
among other things, would bar discriminatory self-tender offers.
These proposals are discussed in Bradley & Rosenzweig.
17 For the argument that this conclusion is also mandated by the
Williams Act, see Bradley & Rosenzweig.
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